In multinomial choice settings, Daly-Zachary (1978) and Armstrong-Vickers (2015) provided closedform conditions, under which choice probability functions can be rationalized via random utility models.
Introduction
The random utility model of multinomial choice (McFadden, 1973) has gained immense popularity among applied economists. However, there has been limited research on the micro-theoretic underpinning of such models, and in particular, on the question of which choice probability functions are logically consistent with a random utility model. 1 Daly and Zachary 1978 provided a set of closed-form, global conditions under which choice-probability functions can be justified as having arisen from preference maximization by a heterogeneous population. These conditions were re-stated in Anderson et al, 1992 , Theorem 3.1, and independently derived in Armstrong and Vickers, 2015 , who improved upon the Daly-Zachary results by increasing (i.e. non-satiation in the numeraire), then we can replace z = y − p j , and rewrite the consumer problem as max j∈{0,1,...,J} [U ( j, a j ) + ε j ], where a j ≡ y − p j . Denote the (structural) probability of choosing alternative j ∈ {0, ..., J} at a ≡ (a 0 , .., a J ) by q j (a). In words, if we randomly sample individuals from the population, and offer the vector a to each sampled individual, then a fraction q j (a) will choose alternative j, in expectation. It is easy to incorporate other attributes of the alternatives and characteristics of consumers in our analysis, and we outline how to that below, after Theorem 1. For now, we suppress other covariates for clarity of exposition.
Slutsky-Symmetry:
In this set-up, Daly-Zachary's Slutsky symmetry conditions are that for any two alternatives k, l ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, k = l, ∂ ∂ a l q k (a) = ∂ ∂ a k q l (a) .
(1)
We first show that the classic random utility model with no income effects implies (1) . We then show the first result of our paper, viz. that Slutsky symmetry (1) implies absence of income effects.
Necessity:
The canonical random utility model of multinomial choice assumes that utility from consuming the jth alternative at income y and price p j is given by
where a j = y − p j as above. Income effects are zero since demand depends on the a's via the differences a j −a k = (y − p j )−(y − p k ) = p k − p j . Suppose (ε 0 , ε 1 , ...ε J ) are continuously distributed with joint density g (·). Then, the choice probability for the 0th alternative is given by q 0 (a) 2 Daly-Zachary defines choice probabilities as functions of price and income,q j (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p J , y). This is equivalent to our notation of q j (a 0 , a 1 , ...a J ) with a 0 = y, a 1 = y − p 1 ,...,a J = y − p J , in that one can move back and forth between the two notations,
.., a 0 − a J ) , and
"Slutsky symmetry" in Daly-Zachary's notation is that ∂q k /∂ p j = ∂q j /∂ p k for all j = k (if alternative 0 is the ouside option, then the corresponding condition is ∂q 0 /∂ p j = ∂q j /∂ y). which is identical to (1) in our notation.
...
Similarly,
where the second equality follows by substituting s 0 = a 1 − a 0 + ε 1 in (4).
The same argument can be repeated for any other pair of alternatives l = k, to obtain
for all a. This shows that in the canonical random utility model with no income effects, Daly-Zachary's Slutsky symmetry condition holds.
Sufficiency:
We now show that Slutsky symmetry implies absence of income effects. To see this, first note that because ∑ J k=0 q k (a) = 1, differentiating both sides w.r.t. a l gives
Substituting (1) in (6), we get:
This is a linear, homogeneous partial differential equation in q l (·), and can be solved via the method of characteristics (c.f. Courant, 1962 , Chapter I.5 and II.2). The characteristic curve, i.e. the J-dimensional subspace on which q l (a) remains constant, can be obtained as follows. Parametrize a j = a j (r), j = 0, 1, ...J and consider
Comparing with (7), we get
implying the so-called "characteristic" Ordinary Differential Equations:
with generic solutions a k − a l = c k , k = 0, ...l − 1, l + 1, ..., J. This means that general solutions to (7) are of the form
where H l (·) is any arbitrary continuously differentiable function. Thus q l (a) depends on the (J + 1)-
That (9) is a solution to (7) can also be verified directly by partially differentiating the RHS of (9), and verifying that it satisfies (7). Finally, note that
and so (9) implies that q l (a) does not depend on income. Since l is arbitrary, we have shown that Slutsky symmetry implies that income effects are absent.
Rationalizability under Income-Effects
The previous section raises the question of whether utility maximization in a setting of multinomial choice that allows for (individually heterogeneous) income effects impose any restriction on choice-probabilities.
In other words, is there a counterpart of Slutsky symmetry under income effects? In this section, we state that counterpart, and show that this analog, plus a set of shape-restrictions on choice-probabilities are together sufficient for rationalizability.
Counterpart of Slutsky Symmetry: Let there be J + 1 exclusive and indivisible alternatives, indexed by j = 0, 1, ...., J. A consumer can choose one among these J + 1 alternatives, plus a quantity z of a continuous numeraire that they can buy after paying for the indivisible good, subject to the budget constraint z ≤ y − p j , where y is the consumer's income, and p j is the price of alternative j faced by the consumer. We assume preferences are non-satiated in the numeraire, and denote the amount of numeraire consumed upon having bought alternative j by a j = y − p j , with a 0 = y corresponding to choosing the outside option 0. Denote the (structural) probability of choosing alternative j ∈ {0, ..., J} at a ≡ (a 0 , .., a J ) by q j (a). In words, if we randomly sample individuals from the population, and offer the vector a to each sampled individual, then a fraction q j (a) will choose alternative j, in expectation. Then our counterpart of Slutsky symmetry is:
(A): For any a, and any pair of alternatives k = l, the ratio
Motivation: To see where this restriction comes from, consider the above setting of multinomial choice, and let the utility from consuming the jth alternative and a quantity z of the numeraire be given by U ( j, z) + ε j . The ε j , which represent unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, are allowed to have any arbitrary and unspecified joint distribution in the population (subject to the resulting choice probability functions being smooth). If U ( j, ·) is strictly increasing (i.e. non-satiation in the numeraire), then we can replace z = y − p j ≡ a j , and rewrite the consumer problem as
To allow for income effects, we let
, where h j (·) are smooth, possibly nonlinear, strictly increasing, unspecified functions of the a j 's. When h j (·) are nonlinear, the conditional choice-probabilities will depend on income, i.e., there are non-zero income effects. This structure is also observationally equivalent to a utility structure where unobserved heterogeneity is not additively separable from the a j 's (see below) in the utility function. Now, for the above set-up, the choice probability for the 0th alternative is given by
Therefore, by the first fundamental theorem of calculus,
implying by the first fundamental theorem and chain-rule that
where the second equality (1) = follows by substituting
for all a, and it is clear that the RHS of (14) depends only on a k and a l , and thus satisfies condition (A) above.
As an aside, note that for the RHS of (14) to be identically equal to 1 (the Daly-Zachary condition), we must have that h l (a l ) = β 0 + β 1 a l for some β 0 , β 1 . To see this, first note that when evaluated at a k = a l = c,
Using this, we have that Main Result: We are now ready to state and prove our main result. The result is that the counterpart of Slutsky symmetry stated above, plus two shape-restrictions on q j (·)'s are jointly sufficient for rationalizability, i.e., under those restrictions on q j (·)'s, we can find a set of utility functions and a joint distribution of unobserved preference heterogeneity, such that individual maximization of these utilities will indeed produce the conditional choice-probabilities q j (·) , j = 0, 1, ..., J.
To state and prove this result, we will use the following additional notation: let a − j denote the vector a 0 , a 1 Condition (i) is intuitive, and corresponds to preferences being non-satiated in the quantity of numeraire.
Indeed, if choice probabilities are generated by the structure
where W j (, η) are strictly increasing and continuous, and their distributions sufficiently smooth, then condition (i) must hold. Condition (iii) is related to the existence of a density function for unobserved heterogeneity. For models with parametrically specified heterogeneity distributions, condition (iii) was previously used to recover underlying utility functions (c.f. McFadden, 1978, just above Eqn. 12). The motivation for condition (ii) was discussed right before Theorem 1.
Proof. WLOG take m = 0, and use condition (ii) of the theorem to define
Now, because ∑ J j=0 q j (a) = 1, differentiating both sides w.r.t. a 0 gives
Substituting (15) in (16), we get the linear, homogeneous, partial differential equation in q 0 (·): 
Comparing with (17), we get
implying the characteristic ordinary differential equations:
for j = 1, ..., J. Using Picard's theorem and the principle of solving linear homogeneous PDEs (see Appendix), we obtain the general solutions of (18) given by ω j (a j , a 0 ) = cons, where ω j (a j , a 0 ) is differentiable, strictly increasing in a 0 and strictly decreasing in a j , and satisfies
and also, using (15)
A general solution q 0 (a) is therefore of the form
where H 0 (·) can be chosen to be strictly increasing and C 1 in each argument, and with continuous Jth order cross partial derivatives. In particular, any J dimensional continuously differentiable C.D.F. H 0 (·)
would produce an admissible solution. Since q 0 (a) is observed, the exact functional form of H 0 (·) is pinned down by (21), for any set of solutions ω j (·, ·) to the ODEs (18). This corresponds to the so-called "initial condition" in the PDE nomenclature. In particular, given any a 0 , the value of H 0 (x 1 , x 2 , ...x J ) at any vector
In this construction, the choice of a 0 is immaterial. That is, for two choices a 0 = a ′ 0 ,
Having obtained the ω j (·, ·)'s from (18) and (19), for each j = 1, ...J, define the function w j (a j , v) by inversion, i.e.
Note that by construction, w j (a j , v) is strictly increasing and continuous in a j for each v. The w j (·.·)'s will play the role of 'utilities' in our proof of integrability. Set w 0 (a 0 , v 0 ) ≡ a 0 .
We now show how to construct the distribution of heterogeneity. LetV j denote the co-domain of ω j (·, ·), and let
where the vector (a 0 , a 1 , . .., a J ) satisfies v j = ω j (a j , a 0 ), for each j = 1, ...J. It follows from (21) and (22) that this function is well-defined. The above CDF implies the density function f : V → R + :
, for any k ∈ {1, ..., J}
Since
J and ∂ ∂ a j ω j (a j , a 0 ) < 0, and
V , each of the above expressions has numerator and denominator of the same sign, and is thus non-negative.
We verify below that this joint density integrates to 1.
We now show that the above construction of w j (·, ·) (c.f. (23)) and the joint density of heterogeneity (24) and (25) will indeed produce the original choice probabilities. To see this for alternative 1, consider the
,
, which transforms the above integral to
Exactly analogous steps for j = 2, ...J, and using (25), lead to the conclusion that for all j ≥ 1,
Also, note that
Finally, to show that the joint density (24) integrates to 1, use exactly the same substitution as the one leading to (26), and observe that
where q 1 (−∞, a 1 , −∞, ... − ∞) denotes the limit of the choice probability of alternative 1 when the a's for all other alternatives are tend to −∞.
Thus we have shown that a population endowed with our constructed w j (·, v j ) as utilities, together with the joint density of heterogeneity given by (24) 
Further Points
Identification: Theorem 1 can also be used to identify utilities and the heterogeneity distributions nonparametrically from choice-probabilities observed in a dataset. Nonparametric identification of multinomial choice models has been studied previously in the econometric literature (c.f. Matzkin, 1993) . Since our proof of rationalizability presented in Theorem 1 is constructive, it provides an alternative and novel way to obtain identification by solving PDEs.
Toward that end, suppose that the choice-probabilities are generated by maximization of the utilities u j ≡ h j (a j ) + ε j , j = 0, ..., J, where the h j (·) functions are strictly increasing and continuous, and hence invertible. Observe that an observationally equivalent utility structure is where utility for the 0th alternative is a 0 and that for the jth alternative is h
, in that these utilities will produce exactly the same choice probabilities as the u j s. We work under this normalization from now on.
We also note in passing that the w j (a j , v j ) are not necessarily additive in the unobserved heterogeneity v j .
Let a and q j (a) be as above. We can use the proof of Theorem 1 to identify the w j (a j , v j ) functions and the joint distribution of (v 1 , ..., v J ) from the q j (a) , as follows. First, note that
where F j (·) denotes the derivative of the joint distribution function of v w.r.t. its jth element. On the other hand,
and therefore, by chain-rule, the first fundamental theorem of calculus, and using w j (a j , ω j (a j , a 0 )) = a 0 , we have that
and thus from (27) and (28), we have that
which is the same as (20). The RHS of (29) is observable from the data, and under the hypothesis of the model, is solely a function of a 0 and a j , which is a testable implication. If this implication is not rejected, denote the RHS of (29) as t j (a j , a 0 ) (this t j (·, ·) can be estimated by, say a least squares projection of
for the ω j (·, ·)'s as outlined above in (18), obtain the w j (a j , v j ) by inverting the solution ω j (a j , a 0 )'s w.r.t.
a 0 , and the joint density of v using (24).
Incorporating Covariates: In our discussion above, choice probabilities q j (·) defined in Section 2, correspond to so-called "structural" parameters in Econometrics. Estimating these from a non-experimental dataset might be non-trivial when observed budget sets (i.e. price and/or income) are correlated with unobserved individual preferences across the cross-section of consumers. A common empirical assumption is that budget sets and preferences are independent, conditional on a set of observed covariates. Hence it is useful to see how to adapt the above results to the presence of covariates. 3 Suppose in addition to price and income, we also observe a vector of consumer characteristics, denoted by s, and a vector of characteristics z j for each alternative j = 1, ..., J. Assume that the choice-probabilities are generated by maximization of the utilities u 0 ≡ {h 0 (a 0 , s) + ε 0 }, and u j ≡ h j (a j , z j , s) + ε j , j = 1, ..., J, where h 0 (a, s) and each h j (a, z, s) are strictly increasing and continuous in a, and hence invertible.
Then an observationally equivalent utility structure is where utility for the 0th alternative is a 0 and that for the jth alternative is h 
The RHS of (30) is observable from the data, and for each fixed z j and s, is solely a function of a 0 , a j , which is a testable implication. If this implication is not rejected, denote the RHS of (30) as t j (a j , a 0 , z j , s), just as above. Then for each each fixed z j and s, solve the PDE ∂ ω j (a j , a 0 , z j , s) ∂ a 0 + ∂ ω j (a j , a 0 , z j , s) ∂ a j t j (a j , a 0 , z j , s) = 0, to obtain the ω j (a j , a 0 , z j , s), invert w.r.t. a 0 to obtain the utilities w j (a j , v j , z j , s) and the joint density of v using the analog of (24), where we utilize the inverse of ω j (a j , a 0 , z j , s) w.r.t. a j , analogous to (22) above.
where φ (·) is any arbitrary C 1 function, and h 2 (x, y) = c 2 and h 3 (x, z) = c 3 are general solutions to the ordinary differential equations dy dx = g 2 (x, y) , dz dx = g 3 (x, z) . g (s, n (s)) ds.
